Multiple banking literature surveys (e.g., Gup and Kolari [2005] , Berger and Udell [2006] , Freixas and Rochet [2008] , and Degryse, Kim, and Ongena [2009] ) as well as regulator documents (e.g., OCC [2001] ) portray broad heterogeneity in the combinations of loan types, borrowing purposes, and lending mechanisms in this setting. In other words, no one loan mechanism is used exclusively for any one loan type. For example, lines of credit are generally assumed to be collateralized by working capital assets, but this is not necessarily the reality; by definition, CRE loans are collateralized by real estate assets, but other assets can crosscollateralize these loans; term loans can be used to purchase equipment, but can also be financed based on the firm's cash flows (i.e., uncollateralized). Similar to collateral, relationship and financial reporting mechanisms can be used across all loan types. A key conclusion of Berger and Udell [2006] is that banks and borrowers consider a combination of all these mechanisms across loan types.
A2. Dataset description
Sageworks, Inc. graciously provided us proprietary data from the Sageworks Loan Administration (SLA) package for the purposes of examining the monitoring of small commercial firms.
1 SLA is an online cloud based tool that allows banks to record and track details about each loan. From the bank's perspective, SLA automates the collection of borrower information and facilitates the loan review process. In addition to providing these organizing features, SLA is a compliance tool facilitating a bank's regulatory review process. Regulators require banks to maintain risk assessment and monitoring practices. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency states that risk management practices should "form the foundation for credit risk measurement, monitoring, and reporting, and it should support management's and the board's decision making" [OCC 2001 ]. The SLA system provides data to guide the bank's credit measurement and monitoring activities across the portfolio of loans, and provides documentation necessary for banks to prove compliance with stated practices to regulators.
From the econometrician's perspective, SLA contains the set of ongoing financial and nonfinancial reporting requirements that the bank and borrower agree to in the form of a collection schedule. Because SLA is an ex ante scheduling program, we observe a static "snapshot" of the information each bank requests from each borrower, and this information does not vary over the life of the loan. Thus, although we have historical data in the sense of when the loans were originated, we do not have a dynamic panel of loans or information requests. We also do not observe loan outcomes such as delinquencies and defaults, preventing us from investigating how monitoring activities are associated with loan performance. We received the dataset in two separate files: a loan file (with anonymized bank, borrower, and loan identifiers and terms of the loan) and a correspondence file (with anonymized bank and borrower identifiers and all information request activity).
To demonstrate the nature of the data, we present an illustrative loan in Figure A1 below. Most variables require little explanation beyond the definitions provided in Appendix A of the paper; however the "document name," "collateral description," and "risk rating" fields require additional discussion. These fields are free-form text, meaning SLA users are allowed discretion over what (if any) information to input into the dataset. This discretion results in frequently missing observations or textual inputs that are likely informative to the banker, but difficult for us to decipher (e.g., the use of acronyms or identification numbers). The "document name" field (which is the primary focus of our paper and the main reason for the initial creation of SLA) has the fewest issues. Most document requests are sufficiently descriptive (and often standardized, such as "business financial statements" or "business tax returns") that our manual coding process is more effective. Table B1 below reports the various documents that we identified and placed into broad categories.
The "collateral description" field is more frequently missing (44% of the collateralized loans have no description) and has much more varied inputs compared to the document requests field. We identify 1,725 different descriptions of collateral, many of which are indecipherable or contain multiple asset types. As a result, we do not use the collateral description field to conduct cross sectional tests across collateral types, though we believe this area is a fruitful one for future research with more complete data. Finally, the dataset includes a free form risk rating field. As part of the credit allocation and risk management process, regulators expect banks to assign risk ratings to loan applicants. One might suggest this variable would be a useful proxy for a borrower's credit reputation instead of the credit spread variable we use in the paper; however, this variable has a number of theoretical and empirical issues. Discussions with bankers suggest this variable does not fully capture credit reputation as well as credit spread. Typically, the risk rating is assigned based on a loan's 2 In Table B2 we conduct a robustness test in which we explicitly control for collateral in the form of guarantees. For example, we find SBA guarantees in 5.7% of sample loans, which is similar to the overall rate of 5.2% of US loans (Dilger [2013] ). A potential concern one might have surrounding loans with SBA guarantees is that the program distorts lenders' incentives to monitor. Several factors mitigate the importance of this concern to our study, however. First, as indicated by the 5.2% statistic, loans originated under SBA programs comprise a very small fraction of overall C&I loans outstanding. Second, even in the presence of an SBA guarantee, lenders have incentives to monitor borrowers because not doing so threatens future participation in the program. Moreover, lenders incur the first losses on SBA loans, and the government only reimburses them for losses up to a maximum percentage per the SBA guarantee. Because the collateral description field is noisy, the guarantor indicator variable used in Table B2 is also noisy, and we suggest future research investigate the different types of collateral.
perceived risk based on generic features such as loan type and borrower industry. The credit spread takes this rating into account, but then the bank adjusts the spread based on the borrower's specific credit reputation and ability to attract financing from other banks based on that reputation. Therefore, the spread identifies this additional component of credit reputation missing in the risk rating. Moreover, risk rating does not mitigate endogeneity concerns. Like the credit spread, the risk rating is assigned after consideration of other loan contract terms (such as collateral, financial statement provision, etc.). Thus, from a theoretical construct perspective, the risk rating misses an element of borrower reputation and does not resolve endogeneity issues.
The variable also suffers from empirical issues. First, it is missing for 31% of loans in the dataset. Second, no consistent ratings systems exist across (or, even in some cases, within) banks. Therefore, empirically inferring the direction and magnitude of the rating is difficult. Finally, bankers suggested to us that little usable variation might exist in this variable. Bankers first discern whether a borrower is "lendable" and then assign a middle-of-the-road rating to the borrower and do not expend much effort in finely partitioning the variable. This bears out in the data-despite having inconsistent rating systems across banks, more than half of the loans for which there is a risk rating have a rating of "3" in the dataset. On a 10 point rating scale that we gained access to from one bank, this number indicates a rather generic imperfect lendable loan. This figure presents an illustrative loan from the SLA dataset. This figure is an "idealized" loan because all data fields in this illustration are completed with reasonably intelligible information. In the actual dataset provided to us, fields often have missing data or, because the fields are free form allowing bankers to input open-ended text, have text that we are unable to specifically decipher. The Collateral Description and Risk Rating fields most frequently have this issue.
Loan Terms
Bank Identifier *** This table tabulates the document requests that banks make to borrowers after a loan has been originated. To create this table, we manually coded 697 unique document requests into the broad categories presented in column 1. Column 2 provides examples of the requests within each category. Column 3 reports the percentage of loans with a given request type category. Business financial statements are the most commonly requested documents, followed by business tax returns, insurance documents, and owner personal information. Columns 4 and 5 partition the sample by loan type. The document requests for C&I loans (column 4) and CRE loans (column 5) are generally similar. Banks request insurance documents at a slightly higher rate for C&I loans, whereas banks request tax returns, other financial information, and appraisal reports slightly more frequently for CRE loans.
(1) (2) (3) (4) This table provides robustness analysis of our Table 4 results examining the determinants of financial statement requests. Column 1 excludes observations from two banks in our main analyses that do not collect information for the majority of their loans. Column 2 also excludes observations from these two banks, but includes loans from other banks with no correspondence, which we excluded from our main analyses. Column 3 includes loans missing correspondence from all banks. See Appendix A in the paper for variable definitions. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1) Business Financial Request This table provides robustness analysis of our Table 6 results examining the relation between interim financial requests and collateral. Panel A reports the frequency of loan collateralization partitioned by states with high and low Recovery Barrier Score. Consistent with the hypothesis that recovery barriers reduce the value of collateral, this table shows that loans in high recovery barrier states are less frequently collateralized. One may be concerned that the higher reported collateral rates in the low recovery barrier states may be a result of higher collateral reporting rates in the database (rather than higher collateralization). That is, banks located in states in which collateral is more valuable may be more concerned about tracking the collateral. This concern is not an issue for our results because our coefficient of interest is a diff-in-diff coefficient (i.e., the difference in interim financial reporting requests for collateralized relative to uncollateralized loans across low versus high recovery barrier states). Moreover, Panel B presents the results after conditioning the sample on various partitions. Column 1 (2) limits the sample to loans in low (high) recovery barrier states. Column 3 (4) limits the sample to loans with collateral in low (high) recovery barrier states. Column 5 interacts the Has Collateral variable with the Recovery Barrier Score (high scores imply greater barriers to recovering collateral in default). See Appendix A in the paper for variable definitions. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This table uses our main specification (equation 1 in the paper) to examine the determinants of different types of information requests. Column 1 repeats our main results for business financial requests to facilitate comparison. The dependent variable in column 2 is an indicator for whether the bank requests a tax return, and column 3 provides the p-value for differences in the coefficients in columns 1 and 2. The dependent variable in column 4 is a score measuring the scope of reporting to the bank. The Reporting Score equals 3 when the bank requests both financial statements and tax returns, 2 when it requests only financial statements, 1 when it requests only tax returns, and 0 when it requests neither financial statements nor tax returns. The dependent variable in column 4 is the log number of non-financial requests. See Appendix A in the paper for variable definitions. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1)- (2) This section describes the state variables we use to construct our Recovery Barrier composite score and provides sources for our data.
Variable Description

Judicial Procedures State
An indicator equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state where it must go through a court to initiate a mortgage foreclosure, and 0 otherwise. The judicial foreclosure process begins with the lender filing a lawsuit and recording a notice in the public land records announcing a claim on the property. The lawsuit describes the liability and default, and asks the court to permit the lender to foreclose its lien and take possession of the property as remedy for nonpayment. The defendant (borrower) is served notice of the complaint, and permitted to contest the facts provided by the lender. If the defendant demonstrates that differences of material facts exists, the court will hold a trial to determine if foreclosure should occur. In the remaining states, foreclosure is typically handled outside the judicial process. Mortgage contracts give lenders the "power-of-sale" in the event of default. The borrower is sent notice of the default, and may cure the debt during a prescribed period. If the debt is not cured, the court will authorize a sheriff's sale where the property is sold in auction to the highest bidder. The judicial law process is more bureaucratic and time consuming than the power-of-sale process (Brown, Ciochetti, and Riddiough [2006] ; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi [2014] ).
Process Period
The average length of the foreclosure process in the state of the bank's headquarters, measured in days. The period is measured from pre-foreclosure through to bank ownership of the property, and is compiled from Realtytrac using county and public records. Data on state process periods are drawn from www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-laws/foreclosure-laws-comparison.asp Date of access: February 2, 2015.
If a range is provided (e.g., 170-210 in Delaware), the midpoint is used (190).
Repossession Barrier An indicator equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state with material exceptions to the "peaceful repossession allowable" standard for collateral. Examples of material exceptions include requirements that the person performing the repossession be bonded for property damage to or conversion of such collateral in the amount of $25,000.00 (Colorado), that no attempt to enforce the obligation may be made until 20 days after a written notice of right to cure default is given to the consumer debtor (Iowa), that no collateral be recovered through "self-help" repossession (Louisiana), that vehicles cannot be repossessed from property owned or rented by the debtor (Massachusetts), that collateral cannot be taken via entry into a dwelling unless such entry has been An indicator equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state that has a Recovery Barrier composite score less than 2 (greater than 1), and 0 otherwise. The table below presents Pearson correlations between the Recovery Barrier composite score components described in Table C1. (1) (2)
(1) Judicial Procedures State 1.00
(2) Process Period 0.17 1.00 (3) Repossession Barrier 0.68 0.14 1.00
